cscript.exe

Top Paths

• C:\Windows\System3299.87%
• C:\Windows\SysWOW640.13%

Top Hashes (SHA256)

• 948dfec96312c70ac2a634bec1d13fc607388daa51d63dbb69db813ad154871941.14%
• 6216383428eab3292c5590c70d24b33a7d84fbf1c463e331c40f052e6ea356fe23.16%
• db25c0f2dc48f1f2c3d67c0d1a223e13ac86eaa8371cbe6542073282d680e49b9.72%
• e39b2d570d797ec3349e485dff3fb3b32598f915f4e782ff6faa9f4ecb68233f6.48%
• 3e0b04ab2c927dcbb0bb64aa99b3060481fa7876ac4c12863d649e8beadc88145.29%
• 0e54a952cd1c5cecbac0b00155f6094939484c47ce130aac3441058da60bafa54.42%
• 5234ec52055998eb2a4ddb353d3673663ffe023ceeabb41ef4e3c9222c9a65603.87%
• 330d6e61f1c27dbdf942e8205c1f72c1947f807063f41356fcb580e9be7143041.46%
• c69648b049e35ff96523c911737a0481d52dd06508a561094a4fa895a30a65351.04%
• 4f059ac07f90e95bdaf0d7f0d1c54ddcdc0651a1e0d8aa5f03d11d6b0521177f0.88%

Top Grandparents

• svchost.exe99.18%
• services.exe0.62%
• winagent.exe0.07%
• LTSVC.exe0.06%
• invcol.exe0.05%
• CCXProcess.exe<0.01%
• explorer.exe<0.01%
• cmd.exe<0.01%
• rundll32.exe<0.01%
• KPlugins.exe<0.01%

Top Parents

• MonitoringHost.exe94.25%
• cmd.exe2.28%
• LogMeIn.exe1.34%
• winagent.exe0.65%
• cscript.exe0.61%
• svchost.exe0.51%
• LTSVC.exe0.13%
• taskeng.exe0.11%
• fmplugin.exe0.01%
• WmiPrvSE.exe0.01%

Top Children

• conhost.exe96.53%
• cmd.exe2.02%
• cscript.exe0.63%
• Defrag.exe0.54%
• reg.exe0.09%
• sc.exe0.09%
• scriptrunner.exe0.05%
• shutdown.exe0.03%
• certutil.exe0.02%
• taskkill.exe<0.01%

What does cscript.exe normally do?

Located in C:\Windows\System32 or C:\Windows\SysWOW64. In this dataset, predominantly launched by MonitoringHost.exe (SCOM monitoring agent running health check scripts). Also launched by cmd.exe, management agents, and task schedulers. Common children include conhost.exe, cmd.exe, and defrag.exe.

When is cscript.exe suspicious?

Spawned by Office applications (winword.exe, excel.exe, outlook.exe) — indicates macro-based execution of scripts. Running scripts from temp directories, user Downloads, or unusual paths. Spawning powershell.exe, cmd.exe, or network-capable processes. Command-line referencing .vbs or .js files with obfuscated or random-looking names. Making outbound network connections.

How do attackers abuse cscript.exe?

Macro-based phishing: Office document macros spawn cscript/wscript to execute malicious VBScript or JScript files dropped to disk. Initial access tool: malicious .vbs files attached to emails or downloaded from the web execute reconnaissance, download payloads, or establish persistence. Script-based C2: VBScript can make HTTP requests and execute downloaded commands. Living-off-the-land: cscript is a signed Microsoft binary, so its execution may not trigger application whitelisting alerts.

Detection guidance

High-confidence: cscript.exe spawned by Office applications (winword.exe, excel.exe, outlook.exe, powerpnt.exe). cscript executing scripts from temp or user profile directories. Medium-confidence: cscript spawning shells or network-capable tools. Scripts with obfuscated or randomized filenames. Monitor for parent-child relationships and the script file path in the command line.

False positive notes

SCOM (MonitoringHost.exe) is a very heavy user of cscript for health monitoring scripts — this accounts for the majority of cscript executions in many environments. Logon scripts delivered via GPO commonly use cscript. Some enterprise tools (LogMeIn) run VBScript for management tasks. Profiling parent and grandparent processes is essential to filter out legitimate monitoring activity.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques